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RECENT CASES
AUTOMOBILES-LICENSE AND REGULATION OF CHAUF-
FEURS OR OPERATORS-INVALIDITY OF ARREST AS BAR TO
REVOCATION U N D E R IMPLIED CONSENT STATUTE-Petitioner
was arrested for driving while intoxicated and was later
acquitted of the charge. He had refused to take the drunko-
meter test provided for by the "implied consent" statute.'
Pursuant to statute,2 his license was revoked for failure to
submit to the test. The District Court restored the license,
and the Supreme Court affirmed, one justice dissenting. The
court held, that because the motorist was acquitted, the arrest
without a warrant was unlawful, and the statute could not
be invoked to suspend the license for refusing the test.
Coling v Hjelle, 125 N.W.2d 453 (N.D 1964)
At common law, an officer could arrest for a misdemeanor
without a warrant only if it involved a breach of the peace and
was in fact committed or attempted in his presence.a
Several courts now take the same view requiring actual
guilt,4 but usually the offense need not involve a breach of
the peace.5 Under this view, it has been held that the
unlawfulness of the arrest is conclusively established by
acquittal.
6
The Federal courts and a majority of states do not require
actual guilt and hold that the arrest is lawful if the officer
1. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01 (1961). "Any person who operates a motor
vehicle upon the public highways of this state shall be deemed to have given
consent sub3ect to the provisions of this chapter to a chemical test, or tests, of
his blood, breath, saliva, or urine for the purpose of determining the alcoholic
content of his blood. The test or tests shall be administered at the direction of
a law enforcement officer only after placing such person under arrest and
informing him that he is or will be charged with the offense of driving
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
2. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-04 (1961). "If a person under arrest refuses to
submit to chemical testing, none shall be given, but the state highway commis-
sioner, shall revoke his license for a period of six months
3. United States v. DiCorvo, 37 F.2d 124 (D.D. Conn. 1927) State v. Lutz,
101 S.E. 434 (WVa. 1919) See generally Note, 40 B.U.L.REv. 58 (1960)
4. See Edgin v. Talley, 169 Ark. 662, 276 S.W 591 (1925) People v. Dority,
282 App. Div. 995, 125 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1953) Jones v. State, 202 P.2d 228 (Okla.
1949).
5. Howard v. State, 137 Ark. 111, 208 S.W 293 (1919) State v. Smith, 37
N.J. 481, 181 A.2d 761 (1962). Where breach of the peace is required, driving
while intoxicated has been held to be such a crime. City of Troy v. Cummins,
107 Ohio App. 318, 159 N.E.2d 239 (1958).
6. Parrott v. Commonwealth, 287 S.W.2d 440 (Ky. 1956). Contra, People v.
Edge, 406 Ill. 490, 94 N.E.2d 359 (1950).
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has reasonable grounds to believe that the offense has been
committed.
7
To deal with the problem of the intoxicated driver, New
York adopted its so-called implied consent law in 1953.8
Since then, a number of states besides North Dakota have
enacted substantially the same statute.9 The rationale of
the act is that use of the highways is a privilege rather than
a right and is thus subject to reasonable regulation. 10 These
statutes have withstood various constitutional objections.11
By compelling the motorist to submit to the test, or lose
his license, evidence of guilt is more easily obtained. Almost
every state utilizes chemical testing for intoxication. 1 2  But
without the implied consent statute, it has been held that a
motorist cannot be compelled to submit to testing. 13  As a
result of this, comment during the trial on the refusal has
been disallowed.1
4
The issue decided in this case of whether the implied
consent statute can be invoked to suspend the license after
the motorist has been acquitted was also considered by the
New York 5 and Nebraska"6 courts. Both rejected the argu-
ment that it cannot on the basis that the trial and revocation
proceedings are separate and unrelated. 7
It is submitted that although greater emphasis has in
recent years been placed on the value of a driver's license,' 8
this court gave that consideration too much weight. It could
7. See e.g., Garske v. United States, 1 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1924) People v.
Wrest, 345 Ill. App. 186, 103 N.E.2d 171 (1952) Smith v. Hubbard, 253 Minn.
215, 91 N.W.2d 756 (1958) Bursack v. Davis, 199 Wis. 115, 225 N.W 738 (1929)
8. See N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 1194 for present law.
9. See e.g., RAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1001 (Supp. 1961) NEB. REV. STAT. §
39-727.03 (Supp 1961).
10. See Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566, 358 P.2d 765 (1961) N.D. CENT. CODE §
39-06-01 (1961) " Any person licensed as an operator hereunder may ex-
ercise the privilege thereby granted. "
11. See Lee v. State, supra note 11 (equal protection) Schutt v MacDuff,
205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (self-incrimination and illegal
search and seizure) For a thorough discussion of constitutional questions re-
garding chemical testing, see Note, 37 N.D.L.REV. 212 (1961).
12. Comment, 51 MICH.L.REv. 1195, 1196 (1953).
13. Apodaca v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 593, 146 S.W.2d 381 (1940)
14. Bumpass v. State. 160 Tex. Crim. 423, 271 S.V.2d 953 (1954).
15. See Combes v. Kelly, 2 Misc. 2d 491, 152 N.Y.S.2d 934 (County Ct. 1956).
16. See Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415, 110 N.W.2d
75 (1961).
17. See also Pieri v. Director of Motor Vehicles, 192 A.2d 807 (D.C. Ct. of
App. 1963). Although no implied consent statute was involved, this same rationale
was used to uphold the revocation despite acquittal of the drunk driving charge..
18. See State v. Moseng, 254 Minn. 263, 95 N.W.2d 6 (1959).
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logically have accepted the reasonable grounds test for arrest,
thereby validating the revocation.' In refusing to do so, the
implied consent statute has been rendered useless as an
instrument for the promotion of highway safety, and the
legislature is left to cure what this court could have prevented.
LELAND HAGEN
MENTAL HEALTH-CARE AND SUPPORT OF DISORDERED
PERSONS-LIABILITY OF RELATIVES-EQUAL PROTECTION-The
California Department of Mental Hygiene, pursuant to
statute,' presented a claim to intestate's estate for the
support of intestate's mother who was an inmate in a mental
institution. Defendant administratrix disallowed the claim
and appealed from an adverse judgement in Superior court.
The Supreme Court held that a statute which imposes upon
one adult, because of a family relationship, a duty to support
another adult, who is confined in a mental institution, is
arbitrary and unreasonable and thus violates the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Department
of Mental Hygiene v Kirchner, 36 Cal. Rpts. 488, 388 P.2d 720.
At common law the state undertook the care and custody
of idiots and lunatics and of their estates. 2 There was no
duty upon parents to support their adult children3 or upon
children to support their parents.4 Nor was there a duty
upon a wife to support her husband. 5  The first statute
appearing in this area was 43 Eliz. C.2 § 7 (1601)
A large majority of the states have statutes which are
comparable to the California statute involved in the principal
19. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-06-15. "Arrest without a warrant.-A
peace officer, without a warrant, may arrest a person. 1. For a public offense,
committed or attempted in his presence " with Smith V. Hubbard, 253 Minn.
215, 91 N.W.2d 756 (1958), wherein the court adopted the reasonable grounds
test even though the arrest statute is the same as North Dakota's.
1. CAL. WELFARE AND INST'NS. CODE ANN. § 6650 (West 1956) "The hus-
band, wife, father, mother or children of a mentally ill person or inebriate
shall be liable for his care, support and maintenance in a state institution of
-which he is an inmate.
2. 2 ODGERS, COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND, 1381 (2d Ed. 1920).
3. Murrah v. Bailes, 255 Ala. 178, 50 So. 2d 735 (1951).
4. Duffy v. Yordi, 149 Cal. 140, 84 Pac. 838 (1906).
5. Hagert v. Hagert, 22 N.D. 290, 133 N.W 1035 (1911).
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